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I. The Three-Dimensional Relationship between Direct and
Indirect Finance
Teranishi (2007) investigates whether the financial system prior to World War II was
an indirect system led by banks, as it was during the high-growth period, or whether 
it was a direct system led by equity and other capital markets. On this question,
Teranishi has long argued that large-enterprise capital-raising primarily took the form
of equity, while the broader macro-level, private nonfinancial sector raised most of 
its funding in the form of bank borrowings, just as it did after the war. Teranishi 
(2007) reorganizes this argument, develops it, and adds further consideration of the
qualitative capabilities of banks and equity markets.
In the process, he notes that in my research to date I have argued that the prewar
financial system was basically an indirect system led by banks, and that is indeed 
what I have maintained, but Teranishi (2007) has caused me to reflect on whether the 
argument for indirect finance really holds up, and those reflections are the substance
of the comments presented in this paper.
Before examining this issue, we must first confirm the vantage point from which 
we are determining whether finance is considered direct or indirect. Teranishi (2007)
notes this conceptual problem in Fujino and Teranishi (2000, p. 148), commenting:
“One must consider how to handle cases in which the borrowers of bank loans use the
proceeds to purchase equity and bonds from nonfinancial enterprises; bank lending
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official views of the BOJ. Any mistakes are entirely the responsibility of the author.may not all have been indirect finance. And there is the further question of what to do
when equity is used to secure bank loans and the proceeds are then used to purchase
more equity.” In other words, it appears that Teranishi (2007) considers it to be direct
finance even if the funds flow through banks as long as the borrower uses them to 
purchase equity. From the perspective of the nonfinancial enterprise raising funds, it is
certainly direct finance as long as the funds are raised in the form of equity. However,
from the perspective of the saver investing funds, it is a form of indirect finance because
the money is not invested directly in the enterprise but instead goes through the bank.
What this indicates is that it may not necessarily be correct to posit a simple duality
between direct and indirect finance. One needs to understand the three-dimensional
relations between them.
My argument in favor of indirect finance is made from the perspective of the saver
investing funds. It began by questioning the idea that the only thing the Japanese 
economy had to do, as a latecomer to capitalism, was establish a joint-stock company
system, and a broad range of social capital would naturally concentrate in those 
companies. What I posit is that a large number of banks were first established to con-
centrate micro-savings and that these funds were used to initiate equity investments.
The intent of this argument is not to ignore the historical facts concerning the gradual
formation of capital markets, nor is it to “discount the role played by equity markets”
(Teranishi [2007, p. 69]). If anything, it is to provide the verification necessary to clarify
the conditions under which equity markets formed in modern Japan.
Equity-secured finance illustrates that it is possible for direct finance itself to be
supported by the flow of funds through banks, and the high relative weight of equity-
secured finance in bank lending is extremely important as an indication of the broad
ties between indirect and direct finance. This relative weight has not necessarily been
accurately assessed in the past, so Table 1 is included as an opportunity for review.
The preface to Ishii (1999) notes that in 1896 equity-secured finance accounted 
for 42 percent of lending by national banks and ordinary banks (even when bill 
discounts are included), and two-thirds of all industrial shares and two-ninths of all
banking shares were pledged to banks as security. Table 1 also calculates the ratio of
equity-secured loans to total lending and overdrafts at ordinary banks and savings banks
in subsequent years. According to ratio (1) in the table, the peak was reached in 1896
at 42.2 percent, declining thereafter to the 20 percent range, but rising again to 
40.0 percent in 1916 before entering a process of gradual decline. However, the reality
was quite different. As can be seen on the right side of ratio (1), for each year, after 1896
there was an increase in discounted bills, and the outstandings eventually surpassed
loans and overdrafts in 1906, but this figure includes a large number of what were in
effect loans on bills. When loans on bills began to be accounted for as loans in 1916,
there was a sharp rise in outstanding loans and overdrafts and also a sharp rise in the
relative weight of equity securities. These points must not be overlooked. If we assume
that between 1915 and 1916 loans, overdrafts, and discounts increased by a flat 1.27
times and the ratio of equity securities to total lending and overdrafts was 21.5 percent,
then the ratio of equity securities in the “discounted bills” that began to be accounted
for as loans in 1916 (approximately ¥1.0 billion in loans on bills, or 63.1 percent of
what were formerly listed as bill discounts) is estimated at an incredible 61.6 percent.
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Table 1  Development of Equity-Secured Finance
¥ thousands, percent
Year  Lending and overdrafts Ratio  Discounted bills Ratio
(end) Equity- (1) Loans Equity- (2)
secured on bills secured
1893 130,163 46,897 36.0 39,256 24,771 15,259 40.1
94 146,005 50,372 34.5 64,768 40,869 25,175 40.4
95 183,790 68,314 37.2 85,083 53,687 33,071 42.7
96 271,008 114,421 42.2 127,813 80,650 49,680 46.7
97 287,734 104,379 36.3 158,682 100,128 61,679 42.8
98 317,769 115,847 36.5 151,904 95,851 59,044 42.3
99 341,551 97,302 28.5 287,670 181,520 111,816 40.0
1900 389,944 107,890 27.7 335,745 211,855 130,503 39.6
01 397,474 104,694 26.3 298,514 188,362 116,031 37.7
02 417,268 99,865 23.9 340,625 214,934 132,399 36.7
03 435,428 95,928 22.0 372,156 234,830 144,655 35.9
04 450,835 95,652 21.2 369,429 233,110 143,596 34.9
05 475,115 102,943 21.7 422,364 266,512 164,171 36.0
06 522,126 134,685 25.8 715,950 451,764 278,287 42.4
07 609,671 152,904 25.1 652,261 411,577 253,531 39.8
08 613,075 145,171 23.7 632,316 398,991 245,778 38.6
09 621,546 131,906 21.2 655,624 413,699 254,839 37.4
10 665,069 147,570 22.2 754,786 476,270 293,382 38.6
11 727,143 157,067 21.6 868,813 548,221 337,704 38.8
12 801,873 175,326 21.9 953,000 601,343 370,427 38.9
13 879,676 198,153 22.5 1,053,000 664,443 409,297 39.3
14 928,530 203,943 22.0 1,091,000 688,421 424,067 38.8
15 917,388 197,502 21.5 1,249,000 788,119 485,481 40.0
16 2,162,128 865,886 40.0 585,000 40.0
17 2,803,326 1,053,265 37.6 845,000 37.6
18 3,759,793 1,257,106 33.4 1,340,000 33.4
19 5,172,745 1,887,978 36.5 1,960,000 36.5
20 5,954,802 1,891,076 31.8 1,546,000 31.8
21 6,311,510 2,033,821 32.2 1,549,000 32.2
22 6,491,651 1,944,345 30.0 1,543,000 30.0
23 6,680,626 1,942,910 29.1 1,581,000 29.1
24 6,803,940 1,933,007 28.4 1,673,000 28.4
25 7,424,601 2,015,490 27.1 1,610,000 27.1
Notes: 1. The year-end amount outstanding is the sum of national banks, ordinary banks, and saving banks.
Documentary bills are included in discounted bills.
2. Ratio (1) is the share of equity-secured finance within total lending and overdrafts. Ratio (2) is the share 
of equity-secured finance within the sum of lending, overdrafts, and loans on bills.
3. The discounted bills outstanding between 1893 and 1897 are estimated by multiplying the year-end bills out-
standing by 0.1417325, which is the year-end outstanding discounted bills of ordinary banks between 1898
and 1902 divided by the year-end total outstanding bills. The year-end total discounted bills outstanding of
private banks in 1893 are estimated by doubling the total outstanding bills for the second half of the year.
4. The equity-secured finance in lending and overdrafts between 1893 and 1898 includes “foreign corporate
bonds and other securities.” However, the share of foreign securities is minor (e.g., 0.6 percent in 1899).
5. From 1916, loans on bills, which had been included under discounted bills, were moved into the category 
of lending. Assuming that the amounts for lending, overdrafts, and discounted bills in 1915 all increased 
by 1.2680683 times and that the share of equity-secured finance within the sum of lending and overdrafts
was unchanged at 21.52873 percent, the amount of loans on bills shifted toward lending accounts can be
estimated as ¥1,001,230 thousand (63.1 percent of the share of previous discounted bills) and the share of
equity-secured finance within discounted bills can be estimated as 61.6 percent. Between 1893 and 1915,
the amount of bills on loans is assumed as 63.1 percent of the total amount of discounted bills, and the share
of equity-secured finance within discounted bills is assumed as 61.6 percent.
Sources: Goto (1970); Ministry of Finance Secretariat and Administrative Division, Annual Review of Ministry of
Finance, all issues (1893–1925); Ministry of Finance Inspection Department, Finance Bureau and Banking
Department, Business Report of Banks, all issues (1893–1925).Ratio (2) uses this weighting to find that, for example, equity securities accounted
for an estimated 42.4 percent of the ¥973.89 million in loans, overdrafts, and loans 
on bills at the end of 1906, with similar calculations putting the equity securities
weighting at 46.7 percent of the ¥351.66 million in year-end loans, overdrafts, and
loans on bills obtained from the ¥127.81 million in estimated outstanding discounted
bills at the end of 1896. These are roughly the same level as was seen in the base year
of 1916, which had 40.0 percent relative weight on ¥2,162.13 million in total lending.
At the very least, during the two decades leading up to 1916 equity-secured finance
accounted for around 40 percent of total lending, overdrafts, and loans on bills (made
in the form of discounts). While corporate paid-in capital also increased from ¥397.51
million in 1896 to ¥1,089.96 million in 1906 and ¥2,468.00 million in 1916 (Bank
of Japan [1966]), there was certainly no decline in the role played by equity-secured
finance. If anything, it is worth noting that as corporate paid-in capital soared during
the World War I boom from 1916, banks decreased the relative weight of equity-
secured finance, and its position relative to corporate paid-in capital declined. Shimura
(1969) argues that equity-secured finance increased as the stock market surged during
the war boom, but this appears to ignore the discontinuity of the 1915–16 statistics.
II. Cotton Spinning and Railway Capital-Raising during the
Industrial Revolution
The next question to be considered is the argument made by Teranishi (2007) regard-
ing the high relative weight of equity in capital-raising for the modern enterprise 
sector. This point has been made in the past as well, but what sets Teranishi (2007)
apart is his contention that the high relative weight of equity was more prominent in
facilitating industries than in modern manufacturing itself and that in both of these
sectors businesses depended on banks only for their operating capital. Meanwhile,
according to Teranishi (2007), indigenous industries met their capital funding needs
with cash on hand and their operating capital needs with either direct or indirect 
bank borrowings.
In this commentary, we look in more detail at the spinning and railway industries
to investigate whether during the industrial revolution modern manufacturing or
facilitating industries were really able to raise their capital funding without depending
on banks.
Table 2 contains the ratio of owned capital (paid-in capital plus reserves) to fixed
assets for the five major spinning companies of the time: Osaka, Mie, Kanegafuchi,
Amagasaki, and Settsu. Overall, in 1890 they were fully able to cover their fixed assets
with owned capital, but by 1899, when spinning capital was truly established, most of
the companies were unable to cover fixed assets with owned capital and the sector
overall was also unable to raise sufficient funding with long-term liabilities (bonds and
borrowings), requiring it to turn to short-term liabilities (current account overdrafts
and promissory notes) to just barely cover fixed assets. By 1910, some companies were
still unable to cover fixed assets with owned capital, but it was sufficient for them
merely to issue a small amount of long-term debt.
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consider how the five spinning companies raised capital investment funding. Osaka
Spinning used bonds and borrowings from Nihon Kangyo Bank to cover funding
shortfalls for its fixed assets. It also turned to borrowings from the Mitsubishi
Partnership, and between 1900 and 1906 had Dai-Ichi Bank discount accommodation
bills issued to Naigai Wata Company. Although subsequently able to cover fixed assets
with capital increases and bond issues, the company was unable to recover from poor
results produced by obsolete facilities and in 1914 was, for all purposes, merged with
Mie Spinning. Mie Spinning itself was in excellent financial health, able to consistently
cover its fixed asset funding needs with owned capital, except for a period between 1901
and 1902 when it relied on borrowings from Dai-Ichi Bank to fund new capacity.
However, we should note that in 1897, approximately one-fifth of its shares, along with
approximately one-third of those held by shareholders residing in Mie Prefecture, were
pledged as security on loans from the Yokkaichi branch of Dai-Ichi Bank, and the bank’s
head office in Tokyo ordered reductions in the amount of shareholders’ equity. The
largest of the spinning companies, Kanegafuchi, relied on borrowings from Mitsui
Bank to fund its mergers, although it later switched to bond issues. Amagasaki Spinning
experienced funding difficulties because of the weakness of the banks with which it
dealt, surviving thanks to an 1897 loan from Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank and Nihon Kangyo
Bank. Thereafter, it was the first in the sector to achieve self-financing, in which 
it enhanced its reserves to the point where owned capital could provide sufficient 
operating capital. Settsu Spinning, which later merged with Amagasaki, also had 
sufficient owned capital to cover its fixed asset funding needs.
Even granting that equity was the foundation for the spinning companies’ capital-
raising, they were not always able to rely on owned capital for their capital investment.
In the process of establishing industrial capital, they were often unable to raise the 
funding required for fixed assets from equity and instead had to turn to banks for loans.
The image of the spinning companies provided by Teranishi (2007) is the companies
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Table 2  Fixed Assets and Equity Capital of Top Five Cotton Spinning Companies
¥ thousands, percent
1890 1899 1910
Fixed assets (1) 3,267 10,410 39,261
Paid-in capital (2) 3,154 7,600 22,530
Reserve and carryover (3) 518 1,532 16,576
(2) + (3) – (1) 405 –1,278 –155
Bonds and borrowing 214 832 1,885
Overdrafts and promissory bills 932 2,163 7,336
(1)/[(2) + (3)]
Osaka Spinning 92 120 106
Mie Spinning 88 90 94
Kanegafuchi Spinning 81 135 109
Amagasaki Spinning — 113 66
Settsu Spinning 97 87 98
Total 89 114 100
Source: Ishii (1991).as they were after they had made it through the period in which they had funding 
difficulties and does not appear to pay sufficient attention to the history of their 
funding problems during the period of the industrial revolution.
Table 3 contains data on funding demand and capital-raising at the railway com-
panies in 1900. One can observe vast differences among the six companies capitalized 
at ¥5 million or more (Nihon, Kyushu, Sanyo, Kansai, Hokutan, and Hoshu) and the
35 railways capitalized at less than ¥5 million. For the former group, the large railways,
owned capital was generally almost, but not quite enough, to cover construction spend-
ing, although bonds were fully able to make up the difference. For the latter, smaller
group of railways, owned capital and bonds together were insufficient to cover con-
struction costs and long- and short-term borrowings from banks had to be relied on
instead. The capitalization of the giant railways differed from that of the major spinning
companies by an order of magnitude, and sufficient explanation has never been given as
to how they were able to raise these funds with equity. It has been pointed out that local
governments used their authority (compulsion) to place shares in Nihon Railway and
Kyushu Railway (Noda [1980] and Nakamura [1998]), but still the question remains as
to how the investors raised the money. For our purposes here, it is sufficient to note the
well-known fact that the Bank of Japan’s (BOJ’s) provisions for rediscounting bills
secured with equity in designated railways played a major role. According to research
using BOJ materials (Tsurumi [1991]), 31 percent of the shares in Hokutan and Sanyo
were on deposit with the BOJ as security in 1893 (26 percent in 1895 and 26 percent
in 1897). Similar statistics can be pointed to for Nihon and Kyushu shares as well.
Shigeaki Ikeda of Mitsui Bank commented on private-sector banking practices of the
time, pointing out that they had few deposits, “so at that point in time, the business of
banking consisted of borrowing money from the Bank of Japan and taking a spread on
it. Therefore, when dealing in bills, the very first question to be asked was whether the
bill would or would not go through the Bank of Japan. If it did not look like it would
be accepted, banks would return the bill to borrowers for unclear reasons. It was just
working on commission” (Ikeda [1949]). In this context, whether the BOJ would accept
it refers to whether it was included in the BOJ’s list of guaranteed instruments, most of
which were shares in designated railway and marine transportation companies.
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Table 3  Construction Costs and Equity Capital of Railway Companies (1900)
¥ thousands
¥5 million or more Less than ¥5 million Total
Construction costs (1) 134,326 63,188 197,514
Paid-in capital (2) 130,283 50,984 181,267
Reserves (3) 3,092 544 3,636
(2) + (3) – (1) –951 –11,660 –12,611
Bonds 4,759 6,259 11,018
Long-term borrowing 338 2,160 2,498
Short-term borrowing 1,365 6,068 7,433
Notes: 1. Paid-in capital of ¥5 million or more includes six companies: Nihon, Kyushu, Sanyo, Kansai,
Hokutan, and Hoshu.
2. Paid-in capital of less than ¥5 million includes 35 companies.
Source: Ishii (1991).Oumi Railway provides an example from the smaller-railway group. At the end 
of 1900, its paid-in capital of ¥901,000 was nowhere near enough to cover its 
construction costs of ¥1,614,000, so the president wrote and the board of directors
all endorsed accommodation bills for ¥832,000 that were discounted by banks in
Shiga Prefecture, Kyoto, and Osaka. Over a period of four years, Kitahama Bank in
Osaka is said to have rolled over short-term unsecured bills 20 times (Choginshi
Kenkyukai [1984]).
In other words, behind the placement of shares in the largest railway companies
was powerful support from the banking system, led by the BOJ. For smaller railways
that lacked such support, it was necessary to rely on lending from banks facilitated by
the connections of managers and major shareholders.
III. Funding for Equity Investments
Another question to be considered is how investors buying shares accumulated the
funds for these investments. Even if they borrowed funds from banks, this still
assumes that investors had a certain amount of their own money. This question is not
one of the key topics in Teranishi (2007), but it is an important and unavoidable issue
when considering the question of indirect or direct finance, which is why I want to
address it here.
Unfortunately, there is very little empirical research focusing on this area. There are
studies of accumulation by the general zaibatsu, but not much has been done regard-
ing other investors. Let us consider the case of Eiichi Shibusawa. Shibusawa ranked
25th in an 1898 nationwide survey of major shareholders, with holdings worth ¥1.14
million at market prices. When the Imperial Family and nobility were excluded, he
ranked 14th among the private bourgeois, making him one of Japan’s most powerful
investors. According to a study investigating the funding for these investments
(Shimada [1998]), Shibusawa, who sat on the boards of 28 companies in 1902, earned
money from stock trading as well as dividends, and this is what provided funding for
investments. Unfortunately, there is no balance sheet for the Shibusawa family, so it is
unknown to what extent funds were borrowed from banks. Nonetheless, the profit/loss
account for the Shibusawa family in 1891, produced in Shimada (1998), finds that
¥42,240 in credit interest was paid against dividend income of ¥90,234. Assuming 
an average payout ratio of 12 percent for dividends and an average interest rate of 
8 percent for bank loans, Shibusawa’s equity holdings would have averaged ¥751,950
and bank borrowings ¥528,000. In other words, an enormous sum equivalent to 
70 percent of the par value of the shares was raised through banks. While there was a
foundation of funds on hand, bank loans were used to leverage this and Shibusawa
invested several times more than the amount of money he had on his own. It is 
reasonable to assume that other people making large investments made use of bank
loans in the same way as Shibusawa.
The next question to be considered is where the funds came from equity invest-
ments by merchants, who made up the majority of shareholders. What immediately
springs to mind are the commercial profits generated by commercial activities with
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companies in which they invested. From the perspective of the capital sector, funds are
accumulated externally and enter the capital sector through the purchase of equities,
which is what enables joint-stock companies to be formed. However, once the 
joint-stock companies begin to develop and pay dividends to their shareholders, 
the dividends may be reinvested, in which case a part of the funding for merchants’
equity investments may have come from earnings in the capital sector. A new study 
elucidates these issues by analyzing the business practices of a specific merchant family,
that of grain and fertilizer wholesaler Sotaro Hiromi, located in the city of Kaizuka,
Osaka Prefecture (Ishii and Nakanishi [2006]). For our purposes here, I would like to
note some of the findings from this study to raise some questions.
The Hiromi family began to invest in equities at the end of the 1870s, purchasing
shares primarily in banks, railways, and spinning companies. Their holdings increased
from the ¥10,000 level in 1891 to more than ¥40,000 in 1896, more than ¥60,000 in
1905 and more than ¥100,000 in 1911. During this period, the family continued to
trade fish-manure fertilizer produced in Hokkaido, just as it had done since early
modern times, but the earnings generated were not necessarily large. Table 4 illustrates
the Hiromi family’s base of income. Up to the early 1890s commerce was the largest
income sector, but when commerce fell into a slump in the latter half of the decade,
securities emerged as the largest earner and stock dividends became the leading 
component in the income structure. Even after commercial profits recovered in the
1900s thanks to direct purchasing from Hokkaido, the income structure did not
change. Table 5 contains the major borrowing/lending account for the family; it is
notable that liabilities to banks increased and decreased in parallel with changes in
securities holdings. Assuming that it had become possible for the family to borrow
from banks, the commercial profits that it had accumulated to that point in time were
first used to invest in equities, and then, when making further equity investments 
during the World War I period, as was done in 1916, the family depended on loans
from banks and continued to borrow from banks thereafter. Equity earnings after
World War I have been omitted from this paper, but they were fairly large for the 
family and it was certainly possible for them to repay their loans. Nonetheless, they
84 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MARCH 2007
Table 4  Development of Profit Sources of the Hiromi Family
¥, annual average
Period Commercial Real estate Securities Total, including
activities other sources
1884–86 2,858 433 331 3,519
1887–89 980 475 584 2,289
1890–92 3,670 831 745 5,444
1893–95 3,787 890 938 5,726
1896–98 –195 1,297 4,129 5,362
1899–1901 –2,149 0 4,237 2,213
1902–04 3,231 48 3,546 6,945
1905–07 2,991 –42 7,377 10,923
1909–11 2,323 1,968 6,757 11,501
Source: Nakamura (2003).continued to borrow at a certain level and invest their equity earnings in the home
and real estate sectors.
The Hiromi case study may be somewhat unique because, even though commercial
profits stagnated early on, the family was successful in its equity investments and 
continued to enjoy steady earnings. Nonetheless, it does bring to light the interesting
fact that when merchant families invested in equity while continuing their commercial
activities, the borrowing of commercial funds from banks enabled them to invest all 
of the profits that they had accumulated into equities. This underscores how superior
bank transactions were; such a thing would not have been possible when dealing 
with money changers. It was bank lending to merchants that supported merchant
investments in equity, a fact that highlights the support that indirect finance provided
for direct finance.
Finally, one question that emerges from the Hiromi case study is whether the source
of funds for equity investments was exogenous or endogenous. This is the question of
whether the dividends paid by joint-stock companies were reinvested in the companies
through capital increases and other mechanisms. In this context, the funding for invest-
ments differs from the external funding provided by merchants and landlords, who in
turn earned it from micro-producers. Rather, it is endogenous funding generated
within the capital sector. The extent to which dividends accumulate differs according
to the operating results and dividend policies of the company and the point in time 
at which cumulative dividends exceed paid-in capital depends upon the rate at 
which the company’s capital grows, but one yardstick that can be used is comparisons
of paid-in capital and cumulative dividends against those of leading companies in 
several sectors (Table 6).
Looking at the five major spinning companies, in 1906 the ratio of cumulative 
dividends to paid-in capital (“cumulative dividend ratio”) was extremely high for
Amagasaki and Settsu, the two companies that later formed Dainippon Spinning, 
and was also fairly high for Osaka and Mie, the two companies that later formed
Toyobo. Only Kanegafuchi was below 100 percent. Even acknowledging these differ-
ences, however, the cumulative dividend ratio for all five companies was in excess of
100 percent in 1905, making it possible on the flow of funds side for them to expand
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Table 5  Asset/Liability Account of the Hiromi Family
¥, percent
Year (end) 1882 1899 1912 1916 1926 1935
Cash 1,070 477 457 902 7,844 871
Merchandise inventory 11,605 54,260 30,520 27,805 25,126 27,164
Borrowing from fertilizer companies — — — — –7,161 –2,093
Lending to farmers 5,332 9,805 40,062 32,619 63,358 44,924
Securities 2,482 46,469 119,579 269,822 721,888 586,130
Bank loans –3,481 –50,298 –121,435 –221,053 –325,000 –301,760
Net assets 17,008 60,713 69,183 110,095 486,055 355,236
Equity capital ratio 83.01  54.69 36.29 33.25 59.26 53.90
Note: Equity capital ratio is the share of net assets within the sum of cash, merchandise inventory, 
lending to farmers, and securities.
Source: Ishii and Nakanishi (2006).86 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MARCH 2007
Table 6  Accumulated Dividends of Cotton Spinning, Railway, and Marine
Transportation Companies
[1] Top Five Cotton Spinning Companies (1883–1906)
¥ thousands, percent
Year Paid-in  Accumulated Cumulative Osaka Mie Amagasaki Settsu Kanegafuchi
capital dividends dividend ratio Spinning Spinning Spinning Spinning Spinning
1883 265 8 3 3
84 336 58 17 17
85 560 89 16 16
86 633 163 26 27 0
87 880 356 40 52 6
88 1,900 576 30 51 13 0
89 2,527 846 33 61 20 3
90 3,154 993 31 72 19 0 2
91 3,534 1,265 36 81 27 6 14 4
92 3,650 1,738 48 93 44 21 32 12
93 4,162 2,273 55 104 58 44 40 17
94 4,954 2,859 58 116 57 57 60 18
95 5,804 3,637 63 133 58 74 80 22
96 6,280 4,525 72 148 68 65 100 31
97 6,475 5,401 83 159 81 65 120 43
98 6,520 5,985 92 164 92 73 140 48
99 7,600 7,026 92 177 97 88 165 46
1900 8,200 7,614 93 179 109 108 180 42
01 8,725 8,373 96 140 113 128 200 46
02 10,853 9,173 85 144 121 148 168 35
03 11,303 10,270 91 148 129 168 136 42
04 11,553 11,437 99 157 125 188 153 49
05 12,861 14,287 111 160 106 223 188 65
06 13,961 17,703 127 116 136 268 233 83
[2] Top Five Railway Companies (1881–1905)
¥ thousands, percent
Year Paid-in  Accumulated Cumulative  Nihon Sanyo Kansai Kyushu Hokutan capital dividends dividend ratio
1881 558 12 2 2
82 1,258 98 8 8
83 3,822 336 9 9
84 5,163 745 14 14
85 6,648 1,231 19 19
86 8,062 1,923 24 24
87 9,475 2,568 27 27
88 12,829 3,846 30 33 2
89 23,682 5,525 23 36 4 0 5 0
90 31,837 7,939 25 41 7 0 8 14
91 37,890 10,711 28 48 9 3 12 16
92 41,237 13,096 32 52 13 5 16 18
93 42,113 16,270 39 62 17 7 22 26
94 48,061 20,106 42 62 21 9 25 38
95 55,466 25,766 46 61 32 11 27 47
96 64,721 30,229 47 63 30 13 32 56
97 90,460 37,815 42 57 30 13 25 57
98 102,559 45,236 44 58 34 15 25 91
99 112,647 54,115 48 67 36 16 27 109
1900 128,203 64,674 50 76 39 16 33 77
01 144,598 77,007 53 86 42 21 32 80
02 149,898 89,937 60 95 49 26 38 82
03 149,093 103,536 69 102 56 32 45 134
04 161,991 117,501 73 107 56 33 50 141
05 166,671 134,365 81 120 63 38 58 139under their own power. They then went through a period of self-financing during
World War I, following which they began to invest their surplus capital directly in
China. Turning to the five major railways, the cumulative dividend ratios for Nihon
and Hokutan were above 100 percent in 1903, but the other three—Sanyo, Kyushu,
and Kansai—were well below 100 percent even at the time they were nationalized 
in 1906. Overall, the top five had a cumulative dividend ratio of only 81 percent 
in 1905. The railway sector continued to expand rapidly in the early 20th century 
and required inputs of external funding. In contrast to this are the three major marine
transportation companies. Nippon Yusen’s cumulative dividend ratio crossed the 
100 percent line in 1902 and remained above thereafter. Indeed, it was large enough
that it was able to cover the low-ratio Osaka Shosen and latecomer Toyo Kisen so 
that the overall ratio for the three was in excess of 100 percent by 1903. The usual
understanding is that Japanese capitalism had become established by about the time 
of the 1907 depression, directly after the end of the Russo-Japanese war, because,
despite the fact that the endogeneity of the flow of funds was only at these levels for
leading companies, overall Japan had more or less reached a level where self-driven
expansion was possible.
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Table 6  (continued)
[3] Top Three Marine Transportation Companies (1884–1906)
¥ thousands, percent
Year Paid-in Accumulated  Cumulative  Nippon Osaka Toyo
capital dividends dividend ratio Yusen Shosen Kisen
1884 1,164 43 4 4
85 1,247 115 9 9
86 12,350 1,074 9 8 14
87 12,350 2,055 17 16 22
88 12,350 3,375 27 28 22
89 12,350 4,695 38 40 22
90 12,100 5,905 49 52 24
91 12,100 6,940 57 61 29
92 12,100 7,867 65 69 34
93 10,600 8,696 82 92 32
94 10,740 9,796 91 102 41
95 10,740 11,025 103 112 59
96 15,859 12,388 78 90 40
97 23,769 13,116 55 61 33
98 25,500 15,072 59 65 37
99 27,500 17,629 64 69 46
1900 30,750 20,962 68 80 55 12
01 30,750 24,542 80 92 65 24
02 30,750 28,122 91 104 75 36
03 30,750 31,702 103 116 85 48
04 32,125 35,305 110 128 76 60
05 35,875 39,148 109 140 57 72
06 39,650 42,925 108 153 47 71
Sources: Yamaguchi (1970); Statistics Bureau, Annual Imperial Statistics, all issues (1881–1906).Bank of Japan, Statistics Department, Honpo Shuyo Keizai Tokei (The Major Economic Statistics of
Japan), Bank of Japan, 1966 (in Japanese).
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